Partnership With Government: An Exit Strategy for Philanthropies? by Knox, Colin & Quirk, Padraic
The Foundation Review 
Volume 9 
Issue 1 Exit Strategies 
4-2017 
Partnership With Government: An Exit Strategy for Philanthropies? 
Colin Knox 
Nazarbayev University and Ulster University 
Padraic Quirk 
Social Change Initiative 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/tfr 
 Part of the Nonprofit Administration and Management Commons, and the Public Affairs, Public Policy 
and Public Administration Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Knox, C., & Quirk, P. (2017). Partnership With Government: An Exit Strategy for Philanthropies?. The 
Foundation Review, 9(1). https://doi.org/10.9707/1944-5660.1348 
Copyright © 2017 Dorothy A. Johnson Center for Philanthropy at Grand Valley State University. The Foundation 
Review is reproduced electronically by ScholarWorks@GVSU. https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/tfr 
The Foundation Review  //  2017  Vol 9:1    23
R
esults
Partnership With Government: 
An Exit Strategy for Philanthropies? 
Colin Knox, Ph.D., Nazarbayev University and Ulster University 
and Padraic Quirk, Ph.D., Social Change Initiative
Keywords: Atlantic Philanthropies, exit strategy, Delivering Social Change, Northern Ireland
Introduction
Atlantic Philanthropies is a limited-life foun-
dation that has been making grants since 1982 
in eight countries. In 2002 the foundation 
announced its intention to distribute all of its 
assets and close down by 2020; by that point 
it will have granted an estimated $7.7 billion 
worldwide, the largest exercise in limited-life 
philanthropy to date. Atlantic Philanthropies 
has described its philosophy in the following 
way: “Our goal, simply put, is to do as much 
good as possible, for as many disadvantaged and 
vulnerable people as possible, as soon as possi-
ble” (2005, p. 3). Underpinning this general goal 
is a particular focus on tackling global inequal-
ities and injustice. The founder of Atlantic 
Philanthropies, Chuck Feeney, imbued the foun-
dation with his personal philosophy of “giving 
while living” to achieve profound social change 
during his lifetime.
This article will examine Atlantic’s work in 
Northern Ireland, where since 1991 it has sup-
ported three thematic intervention areas: aging; 
children and young people; and reconciliation 
and human rights. Across these program areas 
some basic working principles applied: tackle 
the root causes, rather than the symptoms, of 
disadvantage; lever new or match funding for 
interventions; and mainstream successful pol-
icy and practice across Northern Ireland and 
beyond. Atlantic’s funding approach involved 
supporting key nongovernmental organizations 
to drive and advocate for change. As part of its 
exit strategy, Atlantic Philanthropies has moved 
to partnering with the power-sharing Northern 
Key Points
 • This article is a case study of Atlantic Philan-
thropies’ work in Northern Ireland, where 
it supported three thematic intervention 
areas: aging; children and young people; and 
reconciliation and human rights. Atlantic, a 
limited-life foundation that has been making 
grants since 1982 in eight countries, will 
close down by 2020 and is engaged in an 
exit strategy. 
 • Atlantic’s original funding approach involved 
supporting key nongovernmental organi-
zations to drive and advocate for change; 
its work helped to support and consolidate 
the peace process in that country. Its exit 
strategy has involved a formal partnership 
arrangement with the Northern Ireland 
Assembly to take external interventions to 
scale and mainstream services previously 
funded through NGOs. 
 • This article draws on qualitative data 
gathered through interviews with key 
stakeholders — the funder, government 
officials, and NGOs — and considers 
the consequences of this approach for 
sustaining and mainstreaming policies 
and practices. It also offers both specific 
and general lessons on partnering with 
government as an exit strategy.
Ireland Assembly, a radical shift in both strategic 
and operational terms. 
Based on reflective practice, this article will 
examine Atlantic Philanthropies’ move from a 
bottom-up external funder that worked through 
doi: 10.9707/1944-5660.1348
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NGOs to a top-down, insider, partnership role 
with the government of Northern Ireland. It 
will also draw on qualitative data gathered 
through interviews with key stakeholders — the 
funder, government officials, and NGOs — and 
consider the consequences of this approach 
for sustaining and mainstreaming policies and 
practices. The article concludes with an exam-
ination of the lessons learned from partnering 
with government as an exit strategy: Atlantic’s 
role changed from funding NGOs to advocate 
for policy change outside government to one 
in which Atlantic is actively collaborating with 
government. The aim is to capture the learning 
from actors directly involved in the partnership 
process. What is offered is a formative overview 
of issues considered important by the stakehold-
ers based on early reflections on their experience 
with Atlantic’s exit strategy. Interviewees remain 
anonymous and no reference is made to their 
host departments for reasons of confidenti-
ality; within Northern Ireland’s small policy 
community, members could otherwise identify 
respondents who gave freely of their time and 
opinions in good faith.
The Northern Ireland Context
The context of Atlantic’s work in Northern 
Ireland is important in understanding the role 
it has played. The island of Ireland was parti-
tioned in 1921, with the southern 26 counties 
gaining independence from Britain and the 
remaining six counties in the northeast remain-
ing part of the United Kingdom. The new state 
of Northern Ireland had a Protestant majority 
(roughly 65 percent at the time of partition) and 
acquired its own parliament and considerable 
autonomy within the U.K. A chronically inse-
cure Protestant majority, an alienated Catholic 
minority, electoral malpractice, ethnic bias in 
the distribution of housing and welfare services, 
and a declining economy meant that the state 
could never command full political legitimacy. 
During the 1960s a civil rights movement began 
to campaign for more equitable access to political 
power, social provision, and cultural recogni-
tion. It met with resistance and divisions within 
unionism — those with allegiance to the U.K. 
Politics spilled onto the streets. In 1969 the 
London government deployed the British army 
in an attempt to restore order. By the mid-1990s, 
more than 3,500 people had been killed. Between 
1974 and the cease-fires of 1994 there were seven 
attempts to reach a political and constitutional 
settlement. All of the initiatives were London-
led and included an element of power-sharing 
between Catholics and Protestants; all foundered 
in the face of local opposition. The first moves 
toward peace progressed along two parallel 
routes: Route one sought to maintain momen-
tum between the constitutional parties; route 
two saw the first tentative moves to involve 
republicans (supporters of a united Ireland) in 
talks. On Aug. 31, 1994, the Irish Republican 
Army declared “a complete cessation of military 
operations” and the main loyalist paramilitary 
organizations followed its example in October, 
paving the way to the Good Friday/Belfast 
Agreement of April 1998 (Darby, 2003).
The Ulster Unionist Party agreed to share power 
with Sinn Fein (the republican political party) 
on the condition that it decommission its weap-
ons; Sinn Fein didn’t do so, and the Assembly 
(established under the 1998 agreement) was 
suspended in February 2002. This fitful process 
was to continue, and devolution was suspended 
indefinitely for the fourth time by Northern 
Ireland’s secretary of state in October 2002 due 
to a “lack of trust and loss of confidence on both 
sides of the community” (Reid 2002). A polit-
ical breakthrough came in the form of the St 
Andrews Agreement in October 2006. Northern 
Ireland has enjoyed a period of political stability 
since 2007 and a significant decline in political 
violence, although legacy issues around flags, 
parading, and otherwise dealing with the past 
continue to dog political progress. While regu-
larly described as a post-conflict society, peace 
remains fragile not least because of such issues 
as the highly segregated nature of Northern 
Ireland on ethno-national grounds and the lack 
of political consensus on how to deal with the 
past. There also remains an insidious under-
current of dissident loyalist (Protestant) and 
republican (Catholic) activities aimed at vulner-
able communities, where those factions exercise 
greatest influence.
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Virtually all of Atlantic Philanthropies’ work in 
Northern Ireland can be traced back to Chuck 
Feeney’s overarching desire to help build a last-
ing, sustainable peace and to reconcile deeply 
divided communities. Feeney’s distress over 
the violence in Northern Ireland became par-
ticularly acute on Nov. 8, 1987, when an IRA 
bomb placed at a British war memorial killed 11 
people attending a remembrance service in the 
town of Enniskillen, close to his ancestral home. 
Feeney saw the gruesome aftermath on televi-
sion while in London and said that he wanted 
to see peace, in his lifetime, in Northern Ireland 
(O’Clery, 2007). Starting in 1990, Atlantic began 
making grants in Northern Ireland, for the first 
five years from its Dublin office. At a time of 
intense and continuing political violence, funding 
opportunities were limited. Atlantic supported 
noncontroversial cross-community and cross- 
border contact and dialogue aimed at broaden-
ing political debate (Atlantic Philanthropies, 
2015). Throughout more than 2 1/2 decades 
of grantmaking in Northern Ireland, Atlantic 
Philanthropies sought to address the legacy of 
violent conflict that prevented movement toward 
reconciliation, stability, and the protection of 
human rights. (See Table 1.)
Atlantic Philanthropies 
in Northern Ireland
The role of Atlantic Philanthropies in Northern 
Ireland has received almost no attention in the 
literature. Jung, Harrow, and Phillips exam-
ined community foundations across the U.K., 
which they define “as independent philanthropic 
organisations working in a specific geographic 
area which build up a permanent collection of 
endowed funds contributed by many donors” 
(2013, p. 411; see also, Daly, 2008). The only 
foundation referenced in Northern Ireland, 
Community Foundation of Northern Ireland 
(CFNI), makes grants to meet a wide variety 
of needs in its service area. While recognizing 
1990 No political settlement
Atlantic makes its first grant in Northern Ireland (from Dublin 
office), for low-risk, cross-community peace-building work.
1993–95
Downing Street 
Declaration
IRA cease-fire
Chuck Feeney negotiates with Sinn Fein (republican party) on 
funding a Washington office to promote a political alternative 
to violence.
Atlantic establishes in office in Belfast.
1998 Good Friday/Belfast Agreement
A shift in Atlantic’s work supports higher-risk reforms in 
policing, justice, and dealing with the legacy of the past.
2001–02 Northern Ireland Assembly suspended
Atlantic supports building research capacity in higher 
education.
2003–14
2007: Power-sharing 
Assembly restored
2014: Stormont 
House Agreement
Atlantic’s role is in cementing peace through interventions 
in aging; children and youth; and reconciliation and human 
rights.
2014–present
Fresh Start political 
agreement on power 
sharing
Atlantic partners with the Northern Ireland government.
Atlantic’s Belfast office closes (2016).
A strategic decision by its board will end all Atlantic grant- 
making by 2016 and close it by 2020.
TABLE 1  Timeline of Atlantic’s Work in Northern Ireland
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the absence of high-net-worth donors in 
Northern Ireland, Jung, et al. noted that the 
position of CFNI was “greatly enhanced by 
major funding from Atlantic Philanthropies” 
(2013, p. 420) and the European Union’s Peace 
and Reconciliation Fund. Beyond that, there 
has been no in-depth academic examina-
tion of the significant role played by Atlantic 
Philanthropies in Northern Ireland.
During the period 1991–2015, Atlantic 
Philanthropies awarded 618 grants total-
ing about $603 million in Northern Ireland; 
the average grant was around $976,000. (See 
Figure 1.) To put the total grants provided 
by Atlantic into perspective in the context of 
public-sector spending, the Northern Ireland 
public expenditure budget is around $12 billion 
per year. Hence, over the lifetime of Atlantic 
Philanthropies’ involvement in Northern Ireland 
it has provided grants equal to approximately 3.6 
percent of one year’s public expenditure budget. 
In the areas of peace, reconciliation, and human 
rights specifically, it spent almost $156 million, 
or 26 percent of its total funding for Northern 
Ireland. This was the largest percentage of its 
spending, followed by grants to higher educa-
tion, at 22.5 percent; children and young people, 
at 16.8 percent; and aging, at 13.5 percent. The 
remainder of the funding was spent on a vari-
ety of areas, including community development 
and civic engagement, youth development, early 
childhood development, and strategic learning 
and evaluation.
Spending patterns in Northern Ireland reflected 
the wider move by Atlantic Philanthropies from 
2007-09 to support a social-justice framework 
broadly characterized as focusing on the root 
causes of inequality, which perpetuate disparities 
in power and access and which can be addressed 
only through systemic and institutional change 
(LaMarche, 2009; Proscio, 2010, 2012). This 
approach captured the mood of political change 
FIGURE 1  Atlantic Philanthropies’ Grants in Northern Ireland: 1991–2015
Peace, reconciliation, 
and human rights
Children and 
young people
Aging
Higher education
Nonprofit sector
Equality, rights, and justice
Community development
Countywide
Founding Chairman Fund
Miscellaneous
Source: Atlantic Philanthropies (2015)
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in Northern Ireland. The political settlement 
synonymous with the Good Friday/Belfast 
Agreement in 1998 resulted in a power-shar-
ing devolved government, but there remained 
many of the underlying issues that gave rise to 
the conflict. As noted by Gara LaMarche, then 
chief executive of Atlantic Philanthropies, how 
the social framework applies in Northern Ireland 
“might lead us to see all of our work through 
the lens of whether it serves to perpetuate peace 
through supporting emerging political and social 
structures that encourage the integration of a 
deeply divided society” (2009, p. 3).
Atlantic’s role in supporting a social-justice 
model appeared at odds with the pattern of 
spending in the field of American philan-
thropy (National Committee for Responsive 
Philanthropy, 2003, 2005; Jagpal & Laskowski, 
2011). Suárez’s research, for example, indicated 
that larger private foundations were much less 
likely to discuss social justice than public foun-
dations for fear of “drawing attention to their 
work by using potentially contentious language 
like social justice and social change in their pro-
gramming” (2012, p. 272). Conversely, those 
foundations that mentioned “social justice or 
social change in their programming reject the 
legal and normative restrictions on social action, 
sending signals to activist grant seekers that their 
ideas and tactics are welcome”; as a consequence, 
foundations become “institutional entrepre-
neurs, pushing the broader philanthropic 
community to reconsider funding strategies and 
acceptable priorities” (p. 273).
Although broadly informed by a social-justice 
framework, it is perhaps a more accurate assess-
ment that Atlantic Philanthropies adopted a 
generic theory of change in Northern Ireland 
that had unwritten principles: judiciously select 
well-respected NGOs, set broad parameters 
for the social changes sought, provide them 
with resources to effect change, build their 
capacity to advocate though the use of robust 
evidence funded by Atlantic, and take their 
pilot projects to scale. In that sense, the wider 
theory-of-change agenda was to build from 
the bottom up, and Atlantic’s role was, as one 
Atlantic interviewee said, one of “leading from 
behind” and “oiling the wheels of high-level 
advocacy” where its positional and financial clout 
added value to the work of NGO groups. There is 
no consensus within Atlantic on whether such an 
approach demonstrated clear intentionality or if 
those loose parameters simply offered the space 
for flexibility in the highly volatile political envi-
ronment that is Northern Ireland. What became 
clearer as Atlantic’s funding in Northern Ireland 
shifted to reflect the wider concerns of building 
peace is that it sought to “normalize” society 
through tackling social and religious inequali-
ties that had fueled the violence and left those 
impacted by the conflict most vulnerable (Beirne 
& Knox, 2014; Borooah & Knox, 2014). Atlantic 
points to a range of successes across the thematic 
areas it supported. (See Table 2.)
While these achievements cover a number of 
issues, a set of core themes and approaches emerge 
from the work of Atlantic Philanthropies. Atlantic 
has always sought to build and consolidate peace 
in Northern Ireland — from early support for 
organizations involved in dialogue (former com-
batants) through challenging work with those 
on the margins and on to large-scale partnership 
investments in shared education. It sought ways 
to use Atlantic’s unique position and perspective 
to encourage moves toward a more peaceful and 
stable society. As Atlantic staff envisioned how to 
make lasting impact with its work, the final phase 
of grantmaking in Northern Ireland, from 2014 
onward, focused on working with government to 
enshrine the most successful models the founda-
tion’s grantees had helped develop. We examine 
this exit strategy in some detail.
The Exit Strategy: Partnering 
With Government
The interface between government and philan-
thropy has received limited attention in the 
European literature. Smyllie, Scaife, and 
McDonald (2011), for example, argue that for 
some philanthropic organizations, the willing-
ness of government to subsidize or fund projects 
initiated by philanthropy is a measure of suc-
cess. Whether this happens can depend on the 
nature and form of the particular welfare state. 
European foundations see value in partnering 
Partnership With Government
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with the state; U.S. and U.K. foundations are 
less inclined, although this is changing (Anheier 
& Daly, 2006). Smyllie, et al. pose the question 
of whether “this activity [partnership between 
government and philanthropy] results in pub-
lic policy development,” an area they argue is 
currently unexamined (2011, p. 1141). Thümler’s 
study of the role played by philanthropic foun-
dations that co-operated with public actors in 
school-improvement partnerships in Germany 
and the U.S. highlighted “essentially symbolic 
types of action that satisfy the social appetite 
for reform while they spare their audiences 
the impositions of ‘real’ change — instances of 
‘successful failure’” (2011, p. 1112). Anheier and 
Daly (2006, citing Prewitt, Dogan, Heydemann, 
& Toepler, 2006) argue that while redistribu-
tion is linked to notions of charity, social and 
public-policy change is associated with philan-
thropy — an area that is being given greater 
attention in research. Overall, in a European 
context, research on philanthropic/government 
partnership working, from the paucity of pub-
lished work, is therefore underdeveloped.
Atlantic Philanthropies took the strategic deci-
sion, as part of its legacy, that it would partner 
with government to sustain and embed key 
strands of the work it had supported in Northern 
Ireland. However successful external interven-
tions are, philanthropic funding cannot and 
should not be a substitute for publicly funded 
services for which the state often has a legal or 
societal responsibility, whether as a safety net 
provider for the most vulnerable or as a public 
good. Atlantic’s programmatic strategies had 
Reconciliation
)  Programs of shared services were developed at hostile “interface” communities, 
improving delivery on issues such as early years and parenting, cyber-bullying, 
and youth engagement for many individuals and families.
)  The number of integrated schools and preschools (where Catholics and 
Protestants are taught together) nearly doubled, from 49 to 90, and the number 
of students being educated in integrated schools nearly tripled, from 7,000 
to 21,000.
)  In 2016, some 325 schools (one-third of all schools) were actively involved in 
shared education, engaging 17,000 pupils. 
)  The shared-education model was replicated in the deeply divided societies 
of Macedonia and Israel-Palestine, disseminating lessons learned from 
Northern Ireland.
Human Rights
)  Downing Street Declaration
)  IRA cease-fire
)  Chuck Feeney negotiates with Sinn Fein (republican party) on funding a 
Washington office to promote a political alternative to violence.
)  Atlantic establishes in office in Belfast.
Aging
)  Good Friday/Belfast Agreement
)  A shift in Atlantic’s work supports higher-risk reforms in policing, justice, and 
dealing with the legacy of the past.
Children and 
Young People
)  Northern Ireland Assembly suspended
)  Atlantic supports building research capacity in higher education.
TABLE 2  Atlantic Philanthropies: Key Successes in Northern Ireland
Source: Knox & Quirk, 2016
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been about creating knowledge and evidence; 
designing, implementing, and testing models; 
and advocating for policy change rather than 
funding large-scale service delivery. As Atlantic 
moved to end its grantmaking by 2016, it wished 
to see how the learning and practices it had sup-
ported could change or influence mainstream 
state-run services. 
Atlantic partnered with government via a 
wider policy framework, entitled Delivering 
Social Change (Northern Ireland Office of the 
First Minister and Deputy First Minister, 2013), 
which was established by the Northern Ireland 
Executive branch to tackle poverty and social 
exclusion through the combined efforts of sev-
eral government departments. Atlantic’s plan 
to partner with government therefore coin-
cided with a period when the Northern Ireland 
Executive feared it was proving difficult to 
deliver cross-cutting outcomes that straddled 
the individual portfolios of several departments. 
In that sense, the evolution of the partnership 
between Atlantic and the devolved government 
in Northern Ireland was opportunistic rather 
than strategic. Indeed, project leaders within 
Atlantic had been negotiating with individual 
departments before the emergence of Delivering 
Social Change (DSC), which offered an over-
arching policy mechanism to work across 
government. The specific focus of Atlantic’s work 
involved three signature programs launched by 
the first minister and deputy first minister in 
September 2014: early intervention, dementia, 
and shared education, each of which had formed 
part of Atlantic’s previous grantmaking portfolio.
The total investment in these programs 
amounted to $75.5 million; Atlantic 
Philanthropies contributed about $28 million 
of that investment and the remainder came 
from the Office of the Minister and Deputy 
First Minister and from government depart-
ments with a direct interest in their functions 
(e.g., Education, Health, and Justice). The Early 
Intervention Transformation Program tries 
to transform mainstream public services by 
enabling a shift to early intervention and pre-
vention. The Dementia Together Program 
contributes to the government’s regional strat-
egy, Improving Dementia Services in Northern 
Ireland. The Shared Education Signature 
Program aims to scale up the number of schools 
involved in sharing classes on a cross-commu-
nity basis and in sharing resources and teachers 
as a way of breaking down sectoral boundaries 
0 5 10 20 30 40
FIGURE 2  Atlantic Philanthropies’ Signature Programs
Atlantic 
Funding
Government 
Funding
In millions of dollars, 2014 to present
Early Intervention
Shared Education
Dementia
Partnership With Government
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Partnering 
With 
Government
Early Intervention 
Transformation Program
Shared Education Signature 
Program
Dementia Together 
Program
Funding $36.7 million total partnership funds $30 million total partnership funds
$7.73 million total 
partnership funds
Aims
To transform mainstream 
services by enabling a 
shift to early intervention 
and prevention through a 
greater use of evidence 
and focus on outcomes.
To develop the extent, frequency, 
and continuity of meaningful 
shared contact between peer 
groups within cross-community 
school partnerships. Aim is 
to support sustained cross-
community learning through 
shared classes, but at the same 
time for schools to retain their 
own community identity.
To make a significant 
contribution to the 
regional dementia 
strategy, which 
promotes a holistic 
model involving the 
community, family, 
caregivers and services 
in support of people 
with dementia.
Details
Three work streams:
• Equip all parents with 
the skills needed to give 
their child the best start 
in life.
• Support families when 
problems arise, before 
need for statutory 
involvement.
• Address the impact of 
adversity on children. 
Funds high-quality programs 
that provide opportunities for 
shared-learning experiences 
that directly support the delivery 
of the curriculum. The program 
also supports the professional 
development of teachers and 
school leadership to improve 
the quality of sharing and 
collaboration among schools. 
Three work streams:
• Develop human 
capital, including skills 
training for dementia 
workforce.
• Provide respite, short 
breaks, and support to 
caregivers. 
• Raise awareness and 
provide information 
and support about 
dementia. 
Expected 
Outcomes
• A significant 
improvement in 
quality and quantity of 
prevention and early 
intervention services. 
• Improved staff 
development through 
integrated teams. 
• Mainstream resources 
redirected to make 
initiative sustainable.
• Improved educational outcomes 
and enhanced access to the 
curriculum for all pupils involved 
in shared education.
• Normalized peer-to-peer 
cross-community relationships 
built through regular contact 
within mainstream education.
• Shared education as a 
component of regular 
inspection processes in schools 
and strategic plans.
• The onset and 
progression of 
dementia in the 
Northern Ireland 
population is delayed.
• People with dementia 
have the health and 
social-care services 
they need.
• People with dementia 
live well in Northern 
Ireland.
TABLE 3  Atlantic Philanthropies’ Partnership Programs With the Northern Ireland Government
Knox and Quirk
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that reflect wider divisions in society. (See Figure 
2 and Table 3.) We consider in some detail the 
views of stakeholders operating within and out-
side the philanthropy-government partnership 
to deliver these three Atlantic Philanthropies 
exit programs.
Stakeholder Views
Conception, Design, and Content
Having three signature programs operating 
under the same Delivering Social Change policy 
framework conceals some significant similarities 
and differences. The Shared Education Signature 
Program, for example, was largely seen as scal-
ing up Atlantic’s antecedent Shared Education 
Program. The Dementia Together Program 
was unambiguously about working alongside 
government to implement the regional strat-
egy, Improving Dementia Services in Northern 
Ireland (Northern Ireland Department of Health, 
Social Services, and Public Safety, 2011). In so 
doing, it carved out areas of work that would 
add value to the implementation of the strat-
egy: human capital development, respite care, 
awareness raising, and delirium. The Early 
Intervention Transformation Program (EITP), 
on the other hand, could be considered a succes-
sor program to the work Atlantic had been doing 
for the previous 10 years — improving outcomes 
for children through early intervention. Much of 
its work to date had been about testing, through 
children’s NGOs, various preventive measures 
early in the lives of children and whether they 
produced better outcomes.
As one Atlantic respondent noted: 
When we decided to work directly with govern-
ment, each of the three strands had been doing 
their own thing, negotiating directly with potential 
government partners in terms of what we might 
do. Delivering Social Change then came along and 
that seemed to us to be a wrapper which could use-
fully provide a rubric for our work.
The design and content of the signature pro-
grams, however, attracted criticism from 
external stakeholders. Those grantees previously 
working on shared education detected a loss in 
passion and commitment to its essence as the 
effort became absorbed into the public-sector 
bureaucracy. In the Shared Education Program’s 
original conception, creativity and risk-taking 
were encouraged and, in the spirit of learning 
from errors and rethinking practice, schools 
were not criticized for making mistakes. While 
probity of spending was important, account-
ability tended to focus on outcomes — what 
had been achieved in the schools. Inevitably 
those working outside the system on shared 
education felt a sense of loss when it became 
mainstreamed. Beyond the specifics of this pro-
gram, moving from pilots to scale can result in 
a perceived or real diminution of core content 
(Ross, 2014).
The design of the dementia program was crit-
icized for failing to take sufficient account of 
existing provisions and, in some cases, dupli-
cating what was already there. The slow pace 
of the program was linked to what one NGO 
interviewee described as “the clunkiness of the 
system, particularly around commissioning, pro-
curement, and recruitment processes, which [is] 
exacerbated when a number of public bodies are 
involved.” However, most criticism by former 
grantees was leveled at the early-intervention 
program, for a “lack of coherence.” Complaints 
took a number of forms: interventions in which 
Atlantic had invested significantly not appear-
ing to any extent in the signature program; the 
number of pilots in a program whose purpose 
was perceived by former grantees as taking proof 
of concepts to scale; the absence of due diligence 
applied to partnering with government com-
pared with what had been required of NGOs 
who worked with Atlantic; and the seemingly 
Those grantees previously 
working on shared education 
detected a loss in passion and 
commitment to its essence as 
the effort became absorbed into 
the public-sector bureaucracy.
Partnership With Government
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lower priority of evidence as a consideration in 
program work.
Officials disagreed with these criticisms:
What we are now looking at are projects that draw 
from existing practice and, by improving that 
practice, become part of a systemic change process 
going forward — antenatal and postnatal path-
ways involving holistic support from midwives and 
health visitors respectively in the EITP programme 
is a case in point. This is changing the system.
It is also worth pointing out that while the EITP, 
with an investment of about $37 million, is the 
largest of the three signature programs, Atlantic 
Philanthropies makes a contribution of approx-
imately one-third of the overall budget ($12 
million). It is not therefore unreasonable for con-
tributing departments to promote ideas that they 
deem worthy of support rather than see the EITP 
as simply a vehicle to take Atlantic’s prior inter-
ventions to scale. Officials also disliked some of 
the branded early-childhood programs supported 
by Atlantic that required licensing and the use of 
copyrighted training materials. Moreover, DSC 
expenditure overall is relatively small. As one 
civil servant pointed out: 
Year-on-year, going back to 2012, we should not 
lose sight of the fact that DSC expenditure is less 
than 1 percent of public spending — it’s tiny. Even 
if you want the “tail to wag the dog,” you have a 
very small tail on a very big dog, so it needs to be 
kept in perspective.
Implementation
The key concern raised by external stakeholders 
on implementation was that the signature pro-
grams were being treated like “an initiative, a 
project, or a time-limited intervention.” In other 
words, they did not have confidence that the 
implementation process to date offered reassur-
ance on mainstreaming. In part, this may have 
been a feature of just how slow the process of 
implementation had been up to that point, for a 
variety of reasons. As one external stakeholder 
pointed out,
When we were working on shared education, it 
got to the point where every member of our team 
would walk through fire to make this work. There 
was a solid, unbending belief that this was the right 
thing to do, buoyed up by a network of teachers 
with the same ambition and commitment. The 
energy that you draw from these experiences is 
amazing. The reality is that it is never going to be 
like that when it is part of the mainstream.
An example to illustrate the problems around 
implementation came from shared education. 
The Shared Education Signature Program 
(SESP) faltered at the outset as its introduction 
became entangled with a trade union dispute 
over academic assessment. From this stuttering 
start the SESP has begun to gather momentum, 
but external interviewees expressed the view 
that its implementation is being carried out in 
the most minimalist way. As one NGO inter-
viewee observed,
An example to illustrate 
the problems around 
implementation came from 
shared education. The Shared 
Education Signature Program 
faltered at the outset as its 
introduction became entangled 
with a trade union dispute 
over academic assessment. 
From this stuttering start the 
SESP has begun to gather 
momentum, but external 
interviewees expressed the 
view that its implementation 
is being carried out in the most 
minimalist way.
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Shared education is about much more that shared 
classes. It is about changing the way in which edu-
cation is delivered by pushing the boundaries to 
embrace joint-faith schools, federations, shared cam-
puses, jointly appointed teachers, changes to the 
area planning process, and a host of other things. 
A key aspect of implementing the signature pro-
grams is the interagency work associated with 
all three areas of work. Interviewees saw con-
siderable merit in this idea and credited DSC as 
the vehicle for making cross-departmental work 
happen. As one official noted,
Given the unique mandatory political coalition 
which we have in Northern Ireland, DSC offers 
a vehicle in which a centre left and centre right 
administration can approach diverse issues that 
straddle their ambitions for growing the economy 
while, at the same time, creating a more socially 
just or equitable society. … For some DSC can 
be an article of faith, others may see it in a more 
mechanistic way — for me, it has afforded a real 
opportunity to work horizontally.
The fact that departments made a financial com-
mitment to the signature programs “guaranteed 
their presence at the partnership table, if only for 
accountability purposes,” an NGO interviewee 
said. One criticism is that their commitment will 
wane after activities have been commissioned, 
but still allows them to point to their stake in 
the signature programs. More fundamentally, 
some interviewees criticized the kind of princi-
pal-agent model (Cairney, 2012) that prevailed 
across interagency work, citing the relation-
ship between the Department of Education 
and Education Authority as one of a number of 
examples: the Education Authority may act in 
its own interests rather than the expectations of 
the Department of Education, causing a princi-
pal-agent problem.
Mainstreaming and Sustainability 
While a number of interviewees were vocally 
critical of Atlantic Philanthropies’ move to 
partnering with government (see Table 4), few 
offered plausible alternatives. Rather, they pro-
vided nuanced comments on the process (more 
explicit intentions on Atlantic’s part of what they 
wanted from the partnership and greater overall 
coherence within the three signature programs). 
There was, in general, an acknowledgment that 
to mainstream provision, services piloted by 
Atlantic’s former grantees had to move from 
external interventions into recurrent spending 
by government departments. The issue for NGOs 
was how this process happened in practice.
It is unlikely that the multiple activity streams 
associated with the EITP can be fully resourced 
into the future. What internal stakeholders argue 
is that the working model of the EITP represents 
an approach to transforming children’s services 
through prevention and early intervention that 
can be sustained and embedded in the way ser-
vices are delivered. This approach attempts to 
“change the way we do things” by posing the 
following questions: Where is the evidence for 
introducing the proposed practice change? What 
is the transformation — which piece of the sys-
tem are you going to change? How will this 
change be sustained in the long term?
In shared education, there was an acceptance that 
prior work under Atlantic’s Shared Education 
Program had been hugely instrumental in secur-
ing significant policy and legislative gains that 
would help in the process of sustainability. There 
were concerns that shared education needed to 
be given greater priority within the education 
system if it was not to suffer the fate of integrated 
There was, in general, an 
acknowledgment that to 
mainstream provision, 
services piloted by Atlantic’s 
former grantees had to move 
from external interventions 
into recurrent spending by 
government departments. The 
issue for NGOs was how this 
process happened in practice.
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education (i.e., low growth in numbers, plateau-
ing at under 7 percent of all school children). 
Shared education is not fully embedded in the 
system and political parties see it in very differ-
ent ways — unionists (loosely Protestants) as 
a route to a single, state education system, and 
nationalists (loosely Catholics) as consistent 
with the principles of parental choice. There is 
also a concern, however, that infrastructure and 
buildings — shared-education campuses — will 
become synonymous with shared education and, 
in so doing, its core principles will get lost.
The Dementia Together Program was designed 
to complement the rollout of the regional strat-
egy, Improving Dementia Services in Northern 
Ireland. The portents for sustainability are not 
good as pressure grows on public expenditure 
and there is little sign of a follow-up strategy. As 
one NGO interviewee put it: 
There is talk that the [dementia strategy imple-
mentation group] will be stood down, which is a 
worrying development, on the basis that if we don’t 
have another strategy, then there is no need for an 
implementation group. My concern is that when 
Atlantic’s money goes we could lose the significant 
gains we have made to date.
Lessons Learned
What have been the general lessons learned so 
far in partnering with government as an exit 
strategy, based on Atlantic Philanthropies’ expe-
rience of working outside and more recently 
inside the system?
Internal (Government) Stakeholders External (NGO) Stakeholders
Delivering Social 
Change
Did not attract widespread 
governmental support as a framework 
for change.
Largely seen as unimportant in the 
operation of the 3 signature programs.
Interagency 
working
Departments with “skin in the game” 
were attentive to where their resources 
were going.
Government departments still find it 
difficult to work cross-departmentally. 
Government officials didn’t always 
value third-sector involvement in 
partnership arrangements.
“Do no harm” to 
grantees
Not seen as particularly relevant — the 
relationship between NGOs was with 
Atlantic.
Atlantic more concerned with legacy 
of partnering with government than 
substance/ success of signature 
programs.
Challenge role Signature programs have a “top-down” 
orientation owned and managed by 
government departments.
Atlantic’s partnership with government 
has muted its challenge function. 
There is a need for an external voice.
Mainstreaming 
and sustainability
There is a legitimate role for 
departments to pilot ideas in signature 
programs.
Fidelity of Atlantic pilots taken to scale 
(Shared Education) in other areas 
(Dementia and EITP). Where is the 
change in professional practice?
Role of Atlantic 
Philanthropies
“Keeping us honest” so that resources 
are not absorbed into recurrent 
expenditures.
Transformative influence in the way 
government does things.
TABLE 4  Stakeholder Views on Partnership With Government
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• Expectations. External funders may have 
high expectations of what can be achieved 
with their resources. From 1991 to 2015, 
Atlantic awarded grants totaling more 
than $600 million in Northern Ireland, or 
3.6 percent of one year’s public spending. 
This is not to minimize the level of funding 
involved: far from it. The key learning point 
for external funders is to be very targeted 
and selective in areas where interventions 
are most likely to influence change. So, 
although Atlantic’s overall financial com-
mitment set against the total public-sector 
budget appeared small, within the three 
targeted areas — shared education, early 
intervention, and dementia — the funding 
was significant and its track record in mod-
eling professional practice was impressive.
• Bureaucracies. Public bureaucracies are slow, 
cumbersome, and must adhere to strict 
rules of accountability in spending taxpay-
ers’ money. In partnering with the public 
sector, external agencies have to accept that 
their funding becomes partly subject to 
the same exigencies, although foundations 
have the power to set and hold expecta-
tions because of the resources they commit 
to partnering with government. Hence, it 
becomes frustrating when procurement 
or staffing processes suck the momentum 
out of opportunities when, previously, phil-
anthropic funding could be deft and fleet 
of foot. Somewhat perversely, however, 
government partners have used Atlantic’s 
involvement as a way of bringing pressure 
to bear on other parts of the public sector, 
either to leverage pre-agreed resources or to 
prompt action. Such is the inertia in some 
parts of the bureaucracy that an external 
agent can, through its resources, be used to 
kick-start public agencies.
• The change process. Effecting change in 
the public sector is fraught with difficul-
ties for myriad reasons. The particular 
experience of Atlantic Philanthropies in 
Northern Ireland was at the level of policy 
implementation. Early negotiations around 
partnership arrangements tended to take 
place at the strategic level with parent gov-
ernment departments in a particular area 
(e.g., Education, Health, Justice), but the 
responsibility for rolling out the programs 
lay with government agencies or arms-
length bodies. Departments often adopted 
a principal-agent role and, as a result, 
implementation bodies did not wholly own 
the signature programs or fully endorse 
what Atlantic wanted from them. The sig-
nificant lesson for external funders is to 
recognize the importance of managing 
public-policy networks, or what Osborne 
(2010) describes as new public governance 
that is “both a product of, and a response 
to, the increasingly plural and fragmented 
nature of policy implementation and ser-
vice delivery” (p. 9). There should also be 
some recognition of the problems associ-
ated with systemwide change in the U.K. 
public sector, best illustrated by Pettigrew, 
Ferlie, and McKee (1992), who highlighted 
the factors most likely to create a receptive 
context for change.
• Relationships with government. Partnering 
with government has the potential to 
change relationships. Working as an exter-
nal funder allowed Atlantic to support 
NGOs in developing alternative public-ser-
vice delivery models with accompanying 
evidence of their effectiveness. These 
organizations then advocated for policy 
change based on proof-of-concept ideas. 
In some cases, this pitted NGOs against 
the public-sector status quo by challeng-
ing existing professional practice. In fact, 
Atlantic encouraged and incentivized much 
more than this. It supported organizations 
in developing advocacy campaigns that 
would “take on” public-sector organizations 
with the aim of changing public policy and/
or introducing legislation. By association, 
Atlantic could have been perceived as a 
policy agitator at best, or, at worst, a thorn 
in the side of government. Moving to part-
ner with government changed the nature of 
that relationship, although not its history. 
Atlantic’s capacity to be indirectly critical 
of government through NGOs it previously 
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funded has, of necessity, been muted. Its 
new role, however, offered insider status, a 
working relationship with senior officials, 
and, as a result, influence at the highest 
level of decision-making to advocate for 
mainstreaming.
• Relationships with NGOs. Not only do rela-
tionships with government change, but 
those with erstwhile NGO grantees can 
alter for the worse. In part this may be 
explained by the fact that NGOs have lost a 
valuable funding stream and, hence, there 
is an element of sour grapes. However, it 
is also true that NGOs, whose passion for 
their work helped inform the very changes 
now being supported in government, get 
lost in the routine of what officials might see 
as “yet another project.” NGOs have handed 
over their “baby,” and look with a very criti-
cal eye at the adoptive government parents. 
Moreover, NGOs witness what they would 
see as Atlantic exercising much less rigor 
in selecting government as a partner than 
they had experienced at the outset in their 
relationship. There will, of course, always 
be criticisms from NGOs that government 
officials do not exercise the same personal 
investment and level of commitment to the 
transferred work. When pressed for alter-
natives, however, NGOs accept — albeit 
reluctantly — that services cannot be sus-
tained outside the remit of the public sector 
and their role must be to ensure fidelity to 
the good-practice models they helped to 
develop. For Atlantic, DSC came along at a 
time when it was looking for a way to part-
ner with government, and its standards of 
due diligence, given the partner, may well 
have been lower than those expected of 
NGOs — a double standard, from the per-
spective of former grantees. 
• External voice. This weakening as an 
external advocate is borne out in the role 
Atlantic plays in the governance of the 
signature programs. While Atlantic clearly 
deserves a seat at the oversight board by 
dint of its significant financial contribution, 
civil servants can be resentful of external 
“meddling” their work. Even those officials 
who accept Atlantic’s presence can reduce 
its role to one of “keeping us honest” — 
ensuring that philanthropic money isn’t 
absorbed into revenue spending in strait-
ened financial times. Hence, having taken 
philanthropic money, some officials resist 
external funders playing anything more 
than a prosaic role. The lesson for Atlantic 
here was to make its presence felt not only 
by virtue of its financial contribution, but 
also in the expertise it brought to the table 
in substantive public-policy areas. The 
wider lesson for foundations may be that 
governments can seek to marginalize their 
influence but take their money — not with 
malign intent, but simply by absorbing it 
into the financial black hole that represents 
the public purse. 
• Risk aversion. It is not surprising that with 
mainstreaming external interventions 
comes the prospect of working with pub-
lic officials and elected politicians who are 
risk averse. Philanthropic money allows for 
experimentation, creativity, permission to 
get it wrong, and learning from these expe-
riences. The public sector does not easily 
embrace this approach; the career trajectory 
of officials and ambitious politicians can be 
tied to the success of policies. Civil servants, 
Philanthropic money allows for 
experimentation, creativity, 
permission to get it wrong, 
and learning from these 
experiences. The public sector 
does not easily embrace this 
approach; the career trajectory 
of officials and ambitious 
politicians can be tied to the 
success of policies. 
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of course, must be guardians of public 
money and their actions can be restricted in 
the knowledge that they may at some point 
be called on to publicly account for how and 
why they took a particular course of action. 
That said, the spirit of “delivering social 
change” offered an opportunity for external 
funders to promote innovation and support 
ways of changing professional practice. In 
public-policy theory, these circumstances 
might be described as “a policy window of 
opportunity in which ‘policy entrepreneurs’ 
(Atlantic Philanthropies) frame issues and 
promote their solutions to policy makers 
or ‘solutions chasing problems’” (Kingdon, 
1984, p. 174). So, notwithstanding a policy 
environment in which risk aversion is the 
norm, there are policy windows that allow 
external funders to influence change with 
policies and programs that are demonstra-
bly effective.
• The role of evidence. Despite the overt 
commitment by the public sector to evi-
dence-informed policymaking, in the cut 
and thrust of everyday life and the fluid 
political environment in which they oper-
ate, officials and politicians can be quite 
short-termist in their need for and use of 
evidence. This is different from the external 
interventions funded by Atlantic that placed 
an emphasis on producing a strong evidence 
base to substantiate the effectiveness of 
the work, including funding randomized 
controlled trials over several years. This 
could well be seen as a luxury that the pub-
lic sector can ill-afford in terms of time and 
resources. External funders, therefore, offer 
a robust evidence base that can be persua-
sive in making the case for policy change, 
and find political advocates who can pro-
mote common interests.
• Sustainability. Clearly an important ele-
ment for philanthropic organizations in 
partnering with government is to sus-
tain the interventions, principles, and 
approaches they have funded. It would 
be relatively easy for government depart-
ments, without intent, to simply absorb 
philanthropic funding and continue with 
the status quo. The question for external 
funders is how best to position themselves 
to ensure the optimum opportunity for 
long-term sustainability. One way could be 
to demonstrate cost savings to hard-pressed 
government departments. The experience 
from the three signature programs has 
varied. In one case, sustainability has been 
pursued through successfully advocating 
for a legal commitment to shared education 
and an education policy that rolls out that 
commitment. In the case of early interven-
tion, sustainability has been promoted by 
changing professional practice and doing 
things differently — and not necessarily 
with additional resources — to make pub-
lic services more effective. With dementia, 
the approach has been to assist government 
in the implementation of its strategy while 
testing models of respite care. The learning 
for external funders is that approaches to 
sustainability can be multifaceted and con-
text specific, but that how to mainstream 
their interventions must always be a key 
element in any funding strategy.
Conclusions
None of these limitations should be read as 
reasons for philanthropy not to partner with 
government. Rather, they are set out as reflec-
tive learning and potential issues to be aware of. 
Indeed, partnering with government offers real 
opportunities to embed models that have been 
developed externally and moved to the main-
stream. There are senior officials in government 
receptive to change, open to the challenge of 
doing things differently, and grateful for exter-
nal funding that affords them the opportunity 
for experimentation and innovation. Some are 
simply weighed down by the bureaucracy in 
which they operate and find it difficult to change 
course. Others seize the opportunity, value the 
evidence base of external funders, and promote 
change internally. 
What is the reflective learning for Atlantic 
Philanthropies from partnering with govern-
ment so far? First, the evolution and nature 
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of the partnership may have been different in 
circumstances where Atlantic had not been a 
spend-down foundation. A broader time frame 
would have been available to forge relationships 
with government officials who were conscious 
that Atlantic was in spend-down mode. This 
could have encouraged officials to be less recep-
tive, adopting an “Atlantic is leaving the stage” 
attitude. Where Atlantic encountered dyed-in-
the-wool officials, conservative in their opinions 
and resistant to the whole idea of external 
intervention, it simply circumvented and went 
directly to politicians. The risk in such a strategy 
is to unintentionally antagonize officials who 
ultimately are there to implement government 
policy. While this approach is undesirable, it 
has sometimes resulted in a complete volte-face 
by officials faced with policies that have been 
put in place by their political masters; a longer 
time frame may have prevented such an out-
come. Second, Atlantic underestimated the pace 
of change in partnering with government and 
overestimated its ability to effect systemwide 
change. This was made more problematic in a 
political context where power-sharing arrange-
ments accentuated ministerial fiefdoms and 
made cross-departmental cooperation prob-
lematic. Third, Atlantic had developed a strong 
evidence base illustrating the success of its pilot 
projects and advocated for direct implementation 
through a partnership with government. Here 
again, Atlantic underestimated the difficulties 
in taking pilots to scale within a complex pub-
lic-sector system. Finally, the degree of negativity 
from NGOs and erstwhile grantees toward the 
foundation’s partnership with government came 
as a surprise and disappointment to Atlantic. It 
had anticipated that, at worst, its actions would 
“do no harm” and, at best, that NGOs would 
be more understanding of the need for main-
streaming. Atlantic was therefore unprepared for 
the feelings of abandonment expressed by some 
grantees, who may well have developed a degree 
of unintentional dependency simply because of 
the funding stream they have enjoyed. But grant-
ees’ passion for their work and a desire to witness 
systemic changes were factors far more profound 
than the loss of Atlantic as a funding source. 
While it is no road map to effecting social change 
in the public sector, this article has highlighted 
where the tensions exist and ways in which 
Atlantic Philanthropies is attempting to address 
them. It is too soon to conclude if the partner-
ship between Atlantic and the government of 
Northern Ireland will lead to embedding exter-
nal interventions into the mainstream of public 
services, but there is now good will on both sides 
to make this happen.
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